Marginal effect tax rates on investment that are derived from the user cost of capital are nowadays widely used practically to assess the effects of capital taxation. In this paper, we examine several troublesome issues in the construction and use of marginal effective tax rates and user costs of capital. Our purpose is primarily to stimulate discussion and thought and not to provide a comprehensive survey. Our comments fall into two classes. In the first are concerns about the adequacy of the current generation of models of capital-market equilibrium, into which marginal effectivetax rates (user Costs) are incorporated. In the second are concerns about the appropriateness of the assumption, implicit and nearly universal in marginal effective rate calculations, that investors expect a given tax code to remain unchanged forever. Because the actual tax code in the U.S. (and in most developed countries) has been modified repeatedly in important ways in recent years, this assumption is clearly suspect. We argue that when changes in tax policy generate large effective transfers of wealth, as is the case with nearly any important tax change, employment of marginal effective tax rates can be severely misleading. When such transfers exist, it is also necessary to consider how the tax change affects expectations about future policy. It is possible to find cases in which these expectational effects undo or even reverse the effects predicted by simple examination of traditionally calculated marginal effective tax rates. countries, which appears to be problematic.
The issue of wealth transfers induced by changes in tax rules is treated in Section III. The essential point is that if a policy change effectively causes wealth transfers then one must take account of how the change affects expectations of future policy-induced wealth transfers. This matters because expectations of future shifts in policy influence an investment's perceived pay-off and hence the incentive to undertake it. In particular, if a policy shift today reduces -3-the value to investors of previously purchased investments, incentives for future investment may fall. Because these expectational effects are not included in traditional effective-rate calculations, a policy change that reduces calculated effective rates might in fact have little or even a negative impact on the incentive to invest.
I. What is a Marginal Effective Tax Rate?
A profit-maximizing firm will acquire capital up to thepoint where an additional or marginal unit of investment no longer yields any additional profit. To finance this marginal investment, the firm obtains funds from savers either by borrowing or by giving savers equity in the investment. In order to pay savers the return they require to make funds available and also to pay the government all taxes due on the investment, the firm must earn a certain return net of actual depreciation on the asset (referred to as the user cost of capitalTM). In broad terms, a marginal effective tax is then the difference between this return on the investment (the user cost) and the return that must be paid to savers. It is typically expressed as a rate by dividing it by the return to savers (or sometimes by the return to investors).
We intentionally refer to MaN marginal effective tax rate here, because there often are many ways to specify the margin for an increment of investment and saving. This means that considerable care is required to apply or interpret marginal -4-effective tax rates.
The notion of a marginal effective tax rate derives from work by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) . Technically, a marginal effective tax is the difference between the internal rates return on two cash flows associated with an investment. Th first is the cash flow before tax rules have been applied, the second is the cash flow after taxes. To compute a marg effective rate, the analyst must first specify an exact investment project (e.g., debt-financed construction of a building owned by a household) and must then specify the precise tax rules that the parties to the transaction For our purposes, the more interesting of the two sensitivity exercises in the Fullerton table is the one relating to arbitrage and financial-market equilibrium. A nagging problem confronted by the tax analyst is the lack of an adequate model of financial markets. This is most evident in the distinction, common in effective tax rate applications, between rates on "debt-financed and "equity-financed" investments. Fullerton deals with this by making a series of fixed-proportion assumptions specifying the fraction of an incremental investment financed by debt and the fraction financed by equity. However, because firms can be presumed to choose both real investment levels and modes of finance to maximize profits, changes in tax law should induce changes in both real investment and financial mix. In general, then, the assumption of fixed financing proportions incorrectly characterizes the market behavior of profit-maximizing firms.
The individual arbitrage -firm arbitrage dichotomy gives a further indication of the technical difficulties involved in modeling financial markets. Firm-level arbitrage views corporations as adjusting their mix of debt and real investment so as to obtain the same after-tax return on a marginal investment. That is, the firm is seen as always making a could gain by holding only highest-return assets, or that a given physical piece of capital has different before-tax rates of return depending on how it is financiedl (Bradford and Fullerton, 1981; King and Fullerton, 1984; Fullerton, 1985) .
This inconsistency can at least partially be reconciled by introducing costly bankruptcy or other forms of risk (Baumol and Malkiel, 1967; Gordon and Malkiel, 1981) . With risk present, for instance, households could sensibly hold two assets that earn different expected returns if the asset with the greater return also is riskier. Although some research along these lines has been conducted (Galper et al, 1985) , it is still unclear how changes in taxation might affect incentives to invest when one convincingly takes account of -7-risk. Interestingly, recent analyses by Bulow and Summers (1982) and Gordon (n.d.) suggest that taxes may generate smaller distortions in a risky environment than in a riskiess one. The explanation is that risk itself deters investment, and that capital taxation transfers to the government not only some of the expected return from an investment but also some of the associated risk. It is this shift of risk to the government that may offset, to some degree, the normal disincentive effects of taxation.
An important aspect of the debt-equity question is that the current tax system treats debt very favorably compared to equity. The fact that debt-financed projects have substantially lower effective rates than equity-financed ones is generally thought to be the source of significant distortions --too much debt is issued and not enough equity (see calculations in Gravelle, 1985) . This may well be the case, but there is at present little knowledge of just how these distortionary costs ultimately manifest themselves. One approach, for instanoe, is that the controlling equity owners in a highly leveraged firm may direct the firm to take excessive risks, with a resulting excessive probability of bankruptcy (e.g., Gordon and Malkiel, 1981; Fullerton and Gordon, 1983) . However, it seems implausible that bankruptcies burn up billions of dollars per year worth of real resources in lawyers fees. Without a clearer understanding of exactly what resources are lost due to a tax system that artificially encourages debt over equity finance, it is hard to feel confident that these putative substantial losses actually exist.
Another possible approach for dealing with the problem of wanting to impose sensible but mutually inconsistent arbitrage assumptions is to allow households and firms to have different tax situations (Miller, 1977; Auerbach, 1983) . It may then be that taxpayers specialize in holding assets that are compatible with their tax situations, so arbitrage need not drive rates -of return to equality. While this approach has some appeal, it is technically very complicated because the marginal effective tax rate for a given investment would then depend on the characteritics of the specific saver financing the investment as well as on those of the firm that undertakes the investment. Little has been done to analyze investment incentives in such a setting.
B. Neglected Tax Rules. Although many of the simpler user-cost based calculations of marginal effective tax rates consider only rates on corporate investment in structures and equipment and include corporate taxes, depreciation rules, and investment tax credits, more recent analyses also treat non-corporate investment, owner-occupied housing, investment in inventories, and public utilities and include, when relevent, the effects of dividend relief, inflation-indexing of depreciation allowances and interest, capital-gains provisions, and inventory accounting rules (Fullerton, 1985; Grave] .le, interest rate, however, international arbitrage of interest ("net-interest parity") implies that a constant before-tax real interest rate is more plausible (Hansson and Stuart, 1985) . These two scenarios have very different implications about the sensitivity of effective tax rates to changes in inflation.
III. Policy-induced Wealth Transfers
Effective rate calculations typically examine investment incentives under a given tax code and assume that tax code Whether one views the economy as open determines assumption of choice concerning inflation and interest rates. In a closed expect interest rates to rise by more than additional point of inflation, in order to after-tax real interest rate (Darby, 1975; Tanzi, 1976) . In an open economy facing a or closed also relationship between economy, one might one point per maintain a constant Feldstein, 1976;  constant world -12-will be in effect forever. This assumption is certainly useful as a simplifying device but the fact that past policy changes have occurred relatively frequently suggests it may be misleading. In particular, the incentive to undertake an investment depends on any up-front taxes or subsidies that the investment may attract as well as on the stream of future tax liabilities the investor expects will be levied over the lifetime of the asset. To the extent that changes in the tax system create an expectation of future tax changes, investment incentives will be affected in a way not captured in traditional effective rate calculations.
A hypothetical example illustrates the basic ideas. To keep things very simple, consider a world that initially has no taxes on capital. In a given year, say year one, the government announces a policy of allowing an investment tax credit. To finance the first year of this credit, the government imposes a once-only "windfall profits tax. The government also announces that in the future, the investment tax credit will be financed by an increase in the tax on labor income. Economists then set out to calculate marginal effective tax rates on new investment. They first note that the windfall profits tax is a tax on old and not new capital, and that the labor tax is a tax on labor and not capital. This leaves the effects of the investment tax credit. Suppose the economists correctly apply the Hall-Jorgenson formula and come to the conclusion that the marginal effective tax rate under the new tax code is -10%; that is, that investment income receives a 10% subsidy.
A year later, it is time to raise the tax on labor.
Because taxes on labor are already high, the government decides to postpone the increase in these taxes for one year. As a stopgap measure, the windfall profits tax is extended for an additional year and is imposed on all capital existing as of year one, so as just to pay for the investment tax credit.
Economists review their marginal effective rate calculations -and note that nothing has changed --the marginal effective rate on new investment still equals -10%. In year three and in all succeeding years, the government again postpones the labor tax increase and extends the windfall profits tax "for only one more yearN, just as in year two.
Although investors may have trouble reading the tea leaves in years one and two, at some point they are likely to figure out what is going on. The pattern of taxation in this example is that the government subsidizes investment up front but then fully recaptures the subsidy in future years via the windfall profits tax. Thus while economists using the traditional methodology continually issue statements that the marginal effective tax rate is -10%, the "true" effective rate that determines the incentive to invest is zero because capital was initially untaxed and because subsidies and (so-called) windfall taxes net to zero.
Investors do not necessarily have to analyze the -14-pattern of taxation here logically and rationally for this to be the case. For instance, suppose there are two types of investors in the market: (i) those who listen to economists and make investments that would be profitable if and only if a 10% subsidy were paid on each investment; and (ii) those who follow the simple rule of thumb of oniy making investments that would pay off with a zero subsidy (tax) on new investment. Clearly, the former investors will eventually end up going bankrupt, while the latter will survive. More generally, ori expects a tendency toward positive natural selection of investors whose behavior reflects a zero effective tax rate.
Thus, even though nobody here need to be behaving rationally, 48% in 1960, 37% in 1980, and 31% in 1982 after ERTA and TEFRA (see also Hulten and Robertson, 1981) .
This suggests that tax policy has become more favorable to The notion of commitment by the government to a given policy is important here. This is illustrated nicely by proposals to index depreciation allowances for inflation. In effect, indexing is an implicit promise by today's government to allow investors to deduct larger amounts in the future to compensate for erosion of real depreciation allowances due to inflation. Clearly, the indexation of depreciation increases the expected net return to an investment if investors believe that (U the promise of greater future deductions will be honored and (ii) the government will not later undertake some tax change that recaptures the future revenue lost to it by indexing. If the government can make such a commitment and investors come to know this then marginal effective tax rates, as they are traditionally calculated, will correctly reflect investment incentives. However, if the government continually changes policy to recapture tax preferences that investors counted on when they made their. investments, then not only will traditionally calculated marginal effective rates be misleading (and generally too optimistic), but actual incentives for investment can be quite low. Obviously, these points apply to tax policy toward investment generally arid not just to proposals to index depreciation deductions.
This desirability of maintainjnQ a commitment may explain why policy-makers do not eliminate the deductibility of mortgage interest payments. If one were to design a tax system from scratch, it might well be optimal not to encourage artifically the consumption of owner-occupied housing by allowing interest-deductibility. However, the tax code currently allows such deductibility and many individuals havepurchased homes at prices that reflect the capitalized value of the deductions. Starting from such a situation, the elimination of deductibility, even if existing mortgages were grandfathered, would cause large capital losses to homeowners.
In effect, these losses would result from an unanticipated confiscation of private wealth by the government. One possible outcome would be that agents might fear similar confiscation of saved and invested wealth in the future. This could reduce incentives for saving and investment.
Finally, not all expected future tax changes involve losses for investors. For instance, suppose the government commonly uses the investment tax credit to stimulate the economy, allowing the credit when business activity is weak and removing it when overall activity is strong. Suppose as well that investors come to learn this pattern. Rational investors will then try to time their investments to coincide with periods when the investment tax credit is in place (Lucas, it would if the investment credit never were used. In fact, the rough data on investment in equipment in the U.S., which are displayed in figure 2 , suggest just such a tendency. The investment tax credit was first allowed in 1962, and was .1024
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